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FEDERAL COURT ABSTENTION IN DIVERSITY
ACTIONS INVOLVING UNSETTLED STATE LAW:
AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND INTERFERENCE WITH STATE AFFAIRS
The doctrine of federal court abstention, when properly invoked,
provides a valuable means of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
adjudication and unwarranted federal incursions into matters more
properly left to the state courts. However, aside from the few narrow
areas where the federal abstention doctrine has been codified into
statutory form,' it remains a "judge-fashioned vehicle"' 2 engendering
the confusion and uncertainty which frequently accompany the application of such judicially-defined doctrines.3 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that abstention is not an automatic rule, but
is rather a discretionary doctrine which requires a case-by-case analysis to determine whether there exist the requisite "special circumstances" 4 which warrant its exercise.- With such an ad hoc approach,
there is little wonder that in applying the abstention doctrine the
federal courts "have reached wildly inconsistent results." 6 The recent
7
Fourth Circuit decision in AFA DistributingCo. v. PearlBrewing Co.
effectively highlights the difficulty of applying such an imprecisely
defined doctrine.
The issue presented by Pearl Brewing was whether a federal district court should construe a state statute without the guidance of
prior state court interpretation when one construction might raise a
potential constitutional conflict involving the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution. The district court construed the statute in a
manner which avoided the constitutional question, held that the contract in question was not within the purview of the statute as con128 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (injunctions against state tax); § 1342 (1970) (injunctions against rate orders of state agencies); § 2254 (1970) (federal habeas corpus);
§ 2283 (1970) (Anti-injunction Statute). The American Law Institute has proposed
codification of the whole area of federal court abstention, including the judiciallycreated factors. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371 (1969) (Official Draft).
2England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
3
See Pell, Abstention-A Primrose PathBy Any Other Name, 21 DEPAUL L. REV.
926 (1972). Judge Pell (7th Cir.) exhaustively reviews the many diverse factors which
the courts have considered in applying the abstention doctrine.
'Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
'Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
'Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute
Proposals,26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 202 (1969).
7470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973).
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strued, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
nevertheless found the appropriate "special circumstances" which, in
the court's view, warranted abstention. The court thereupon vacated
the district court's interpretation of the statute, but affirmed the
order of dismissal.
In the course of its opinion, the Fourth Circuit discussed four
bases for its decision. The first of these, and the one accorded the
greatest weight, was the court's belief that the case presented an
inchoate constitutional question which might be avoided by a state
court's construction of the statute. Second, the court found that the
state court decisions did not provide sufficient guidance to permit a
sound construction of the statute by a federal court. Third, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that abstention was appropriate to avoid
federal interference with the state's statutory scheme of regulation.
And finally, almost incidentally, the court rested its decision on the
absence of any indication that the plaintiffs cause would be subject
to local prejudice in the state courts.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in PearlBrewing is arguably incorrect in two respects. As a threshold matter, it seems doubtful that the
potential constitutional question perceived by the court was sufficiently substantial, either standing alone or within the context of the
case, to have warranted the heavy reliance the court placed upon it
as a ground for abstention. Further, even if the constitutional issue
is assumed to be a substantial one, the court's reasoning, in terms of
the four substantive bases relied upon to justify abstention, seems
open to question. However, inasmuch as the court relied primarily
upon only three of these four bases-avoidance of a posssible constitutional question, the existence of an unsettled issue of state law, and
avoidance of federal court intervention in state affairs-an analysis
of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning must necessarily focus largely upon
these three areas.
In order to understand the significance of these grounds for abstention and their relationship to the situation presented by Pearl
Brewing, it is necessary to examine three generally recognized
branches of the abstention doctrine which have particular relevance
to the Fourth Circuit's decision. 8 A basic tenet of federal court jurisdiction was described by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the landmark
case of Cohens v. Virginia:'
"Professor Wright speaks of "abstention doctrines" rather than a single doctrine
encompassing many elements. It is conventional, however, to speak of a single abstention doctrine which rests on one or more grounds for justification. This latter approach
is adopted here. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970); Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Tax. L. REv. 815 (1959).
'19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 (1824).
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It is most true that this court will .not take jurisdiction if it
should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. . . .With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be
brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.10
However, over a century later the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur upon a doctrine which permits the federal courts "to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given.""
In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 2 the Court announced
a doctrine of federal court abstention where "constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive ruling on the state issue
would terminate the controversy.' 3 Pullman-type abstention rests on
the basic premise that where questions of state law are intertwined
with federal constitutional questions, it is sometimes the wiser course
for a federal court, even when its jurisdiction is properly invoked, to
decline to exercise that jurisdiction. 4 Under the Pullman approach,
a federal court is to refrain from passing on the merits until the
litigants have had an opportunity to repair to the state courts. Thus
if the state court decision on the state law questions moots the federal
constitutional issues, the federal court has been spared an unnecessary constitutional adjudication. '5 Additionally, the Court has
"Id. at 100.
"I1d.
12312 U.S. 496 (1941).
'3Id. at 498, The case involved a challenge to an order promulgated by the State

Railroad Commission, a state regulatory agency. The Pullman Company, invoking
federal question jurisdiction, brought the action to enjoin enforcement of the order on
the grounds that it violated fourteenth amendment guarantees And that it exceeded
the authority granted by the state law establishing the Commission. The Court refused
to decide the merits of either issue, reasoning that a state court decision on the state
grounds alone could very well settle the case and in so doing obviate the need to rule
on the constitutional issue. The Court said: "[tihe resources of equity are equal to
an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction
of a premature constitutional adjudication." Id. at 500.
"This result was actually foreshadowed in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211
U.S. 210 (1908), which required a party to exhaust state administrative remedies
before resorting to the federal courts. For a brief outline of the history behind Pullman,
see Gowen and Izlar, Federal CourtAbstention in Diversity of CitizenshipLitigation,
43 TEx. L. REv. 194, 195-97 (1964).
"Pullman-type abstention has been exhaustively analyzed and discussed. See,
e.g., Keilin, Abstention from Jurisdiction:Accommodation or Abdication?, 23 ARK. L.
Rav. 412 (1969); Schoenfeld, American Federalismand the Abstention Doctrinein the
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pointed out that Pullman-type abstention "serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention."' 6
Notions of comity also underlie the second branch of the abstention doctrine relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in PearlBrewing. This
type of abstention is properly invoked in cases where federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and the court is asked to
decide a question of state law without benefit of a prior ruling on the
matter by a state court. The federal court's decision to abstain in
such situations turns on the degree of uncertainty that its adjudication of the state law question would entail. 7 If the state law is so
unsettled as to prevent a sound federal court decision, abstention
may be ordered. 8 However, if the state law question is merely "difficult," abstention is inappropriate. 9 Thus, having found the state law
sufficiently unsettled as to preclude a sound construction of the state
statute, the Fourth Circuit applied this branch of the abstention
doctrine in conjunction with its Pullman-type ground for abstention
and concluded, "[s]ince in this case the state law is unclear and a
state court decision could conceivably avoid a constitutional decision,
' 2
abstention is appropriate.
While this combination of an inchoate constitutional question
with the uncertainty of the state law was particularly persuasive to
the court in PearlBrewing, the Fourth Circuit also pointed to avoidance of federal interference in state affairs as a third ground for abstaining. This type of abstention finds its roots in Burford v. Sun Oil
Supreme Court, 73 DICK. L. Rzv. 605 (1969); Nieto, The Abstention Doctrine, 40
DENVER LAW CENTER J. 45 (1963); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37
TEX. L. REV. 815 (1959); Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The
Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959).
"Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
"7This branch of the abstention doctrine is, of course, a consequence of the rule
announced in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requiring federal courts
in diversity cases to decide state questions according to state law. Among the many
problems the Erie doctrine raises, perhaps the most crucial one for the purpose of
abstention, is at what point the federal court should defer to the state courts in the
interpretation of state law.
"Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185
(1959); Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971).
"The leading case on the subject is Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943), where the Supreme Court refused to order abstention because it found the
question of state law merely "difficult." See also McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unity School Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402
(1952); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967).
n 47 0 F.2d at 1213.
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Co.,2 a case decided shortly after Pullman. Burford, like Pullman,'
involved a challenge to an order issued by a state regulatory agency.?
But unlike the Pullman case, the Burford Court's rationale for ordering abstention was based upon the extraordinary complexity of the
state regulatory scheme, 24 the existence of a clearly outlined state
procedure for dealing with the issues raised by the case25 and the fact
that federal court decisions had, on previous occasions, resulted in
serious disruptions of the state's policies. 2 After having reviewed
these factors, the Court concluded that abstention was appropriate,
saying:
These questions of regulation . . . so clearly involves [sic]
basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should
be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to
consider them.

27

Burford, therefore, stands for the proposition that federal courts may,
even when their jurisdiction is properly invoked, 28 abstain from deciding state issues if such a decision might unduly disrupt a state's
administration of its own affairs. 29 Applying this Burford-type reason21319 U.S. 315 (1943).

2See note 13 supra.
2'At issue here was an oil proration order issued by the Texas Railroad Commission which was the state administrative body charged with regulating the exploitation
of the2 Texas oil fields. 319 U.S. at 316-18.
1The very nature of the system of oil regulation involved in the case dictated that
any decision rendered would necessarily involve not only legal considerations, but
complex environmental and technological factors as well.
2Pointing to the fact that under the Texae regulatory procedure only one particular state court was to hear all challenges to the agency's orders, the Court noted that
such an arrangement permitted that state court to develop expertise in the difficult
field of oil regulaton and prevented the confusion that would be engendered by permitting many courts to review the agency's orders. Hence, the Court concluded that "the
Texas courts are working partners with the Railroad Commission in the business of
creating a regulatory system for the oil industry." 319 U.S. at 326.
6
Id. at 327-30.
2Id. at 332.
"Federal jurisdiction in Burford was predicated upon diversity of citizenship, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), and the existence of a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
However, it seems that for the sake of its decision, the Supreme Court assumed that
diversity alone was sufficient to support jurisdiction. Thus the case was apparently
decided on that basis. 319 U.S. at 317-18 (semble). See also id. at 334 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
"This same rational was invoked in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.,
341 U.S. 341 (1951), to justify abstention. The Court said:
[This case] does not involve construction of a statute so ill-defined
that a federal court should hold the case pending a definitive construction of that statute in the state courts. .

.

. We also put to one side
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ing to the situation presented in Pearl Brewing, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that abstention was appropriate to avoid what it felt would
be a "[p]eripheral and episodic" '0 incursion into the state's statutory scheme of liquor regulation.
Thus, it was the convergence of a Pullman-type situation, an
unsettled question of state law, and the existence of Burford-type
considerations which primarily led the Fourth Circuit to conclude in
Pearl Brewing that the factual setting of the case called for absten3
tion. '
Pearl Brewing involved a diversity action brought in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by a Virginia
beer distributing company (AFA) against a Texas brewery (Pearl).
Pearl had terminated AFA's exclusive franchise to distribute its beer,
in a manner consistent with the terms of the franchise contract. However, during the period between the execution of the contract and its
termination by Pearl, Virginia had enacted a statute providing that
liquor distribution franchises of the type in question could not be
terminated by a brewery "without just cause or provocation. '32 Relying upon the prohibition of this statute, AFA brought the action
seeking to enjoin the termination, alleging that it was without just
cause.
The primary issue in the district court involved the proper construction of the Virginia statute, which had not been previously conthose cases in which the constitutonality of a state statute itself is
drawn into question ....

For in this case appellee attacks a state

administrative order issued under a valid regulatory sfatute ....
[A] federal court has been asked to intervene in resolving [an] essentially local problem ...
341 U.S. at 344, 347 (citations omitted).
'470 F.2d at 1214.
"Because of the somewhat unique nature of these facts, their close interrelationship with the court's reasoning, and their cumulative weight in prompting the
Fourth Circuit's decision, they are discussed at some length.
37VA. CODE ANN. § 4-80.2 (Repl. vol. 1973). The relevant portion of the statute
provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any wholesaler, vintner, winery or
brewery, or any officer, agent or representative of any winery or brewery:
2. Unfairly, without due regard to the equities of such wholesaler, vintner, winery or brewery and without just cause or
provocation, to cancel or terminate any agreement or contract, written or oral, or the franchise of such wholesaler,
vintner, winery or brewery existing on January one, nineteen hundred sixty-four, hereafter entered into, to sell the
beer or wine manufactured by the winery or brewery.
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strued by the state courts. The precise question was whether the
statute applied retrospectively to contracts entered into prior to its
enactment. As the Fourth Circuit's opinion recognized, the statute
was subject to two possible constructions on this point. The first of
these would apply the statute only prospectively and thus would not
affect contracts executed prior to its effective date. The second, and
only other possible construction, would give the statute a retrospective effect, thereby incorporating the requirement of "just cause" into
all contracts in existence on the statute's effective date, as well as
those executed subsequently.3 3 The district judge construed the statute as having a prospective application only, held that it therefore did
not apply to the contract in question, and dismissed the complaint."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court should
have abstained and not construed the Virginia statute, ordered the
district court's interpretation of the statute vacated, but affirmed the
dismissal.
The Fourth Circuit was thus presented with a Pullman-typesituation where one interpretation of a previously unconstrued state statute would settle the case, while the alternate construction giving the
statute retrospective effect would, in the court's view, raise an issue
as to the validity of the statute under the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution.3 5 The court indicated that if the statute were
read to apply retrospectively, it would be open to serious challenge
as an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligation. Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit's decision to abstain was in large measure a result
of this perceived conflict with the contract clause36 and the court's
"The Fourth Circuit described the statute as "incredibly ambiguous," and then
spelled out the two possible interpretations:
Section 2 of this statute has an obvious ambiguity. The participial phrase, "existing on January one, nineteen hundred sixty-four,"
may modify either "franchise" or "such wholesaler, vintner, winery or
brewery." The district court in interpreting the statute read "existing
on January one, nineteen hundred sixty-four" to modify "wholesaler,
vintner, winery or brewery" and, "hereafter entered into" to modify
"any agreement or contract."
480 F.2d at 1211-12. See note 32 supra.
1'470 F.2d at 1211.
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This section reads, in relevant part: "[n]o State shall
. . .pass any . . .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The court indicated
that it was partly the desire to avoid this constitutonal question which motivated the
district court to construe the statute to apply only prospectively. 470 F.2d at 1212.
"The court pointed out that a state court decision limiting the statute to prospective application only would obviate the need for a constitutional adjudication of the
statute: "[sihould the state courts determine, as the court below held, that Va. Code
Ann. § 4-80.2 applies only to contracts entered after the statute's effective date, no
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corresponding conclusion that the case called for Pullman-type abstention 7 as a means of possibly avoiding this conflict. In justifying
abstention on this ground, the court concluded:
The well-settled doctrine that a federal court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law and the special weight
that doctrine carries in the maintenance of harmonious
federal-state relations requires that a district court stay its
proceedings until a potentially controlling state-law issue is
authoritatively put to rest. 8
In light of the Fourth Circuit's substantial reliance on the possibility of a contract clause conflict and its corresponding application of
the Pullman-type rationale as a major justification for abstention, it
is important to determine as a threshold matter the likelihood of such
a conflict. Consequently, the question which arises involves the
soundness of the court's fear that a retrospective application of the
statute would constitute an invalid "impairment" of the contract in
question within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution, by requiring "just cause" for termination of liquor franchises.39
It cannot be doubted that a state may, in the constitutional exercise of its police power, statutorily impair existing contracts by altering or even voiding them." In a leading case, Home Building and
Loan Association v. Blaisdell,4 ' the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute declaring a moratorium on mortgage debts against a
challenge that it unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract by encompassing within its provisions mortgages existing at the
time of its enactment. The Court pointed out that not only are existing laws read into contracts so as to fix obligations between the
parties, but "the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
42
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
The Court then went on to conclude that the police power of the state
Contract Clause question would arise." Id.
-See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
11470 F.2d at 1213.
31t is important to note that the statute in question, insofar as its application to
the instant case is concerned, would admit of only two possible interpretations: prospective or retroactive application. See notes 32-33 supra.
10Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 317,
rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1081 (1970); East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S.
230 (1945); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921). See Hale, The Supreme Court
and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARv. L. REv. 852, 872 (1944).
41290 U.S. 398 (1934).

11Id. at 435.
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includes the authority to legislate for the protection of the economic
welfare of the state "notwithstanding interference with contracts."4 3
Thus while it would seem fairly well settled that a state normally
may not be prevented from an otherwise valid exercise of its general
police power on the ground that such an exercise constitutes an impairment of contract,44 the import of this proposition takes on additional significance in the specific area of state regulation of intoxicating liquors. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the twenty-first
amendment,4 5 in its explicit grant of liquor regulatory powers to the
"Id. at 437. The Blaisdell Court made it clear that a state statute is not necessarily
invalid even though it would, strictly speaking, transgress the contract clause of the
Constitution. The Court stressed that "[tihe economic interests of the State may
justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding
interference with contracts." Id. This view is not new. Indeed, as early as 1914, the
Supreme Court described as "settled" the question of whether the contract clause
could override the states' exercise of their police power. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.
v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). The theory behind this assertion is the idea
that private individuals, simply by entering a contract, may not "estop" the state from
validly exercising its police power. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S.
247, 258-59 (1939); Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U.S. 370, 374 (1924).
"Cases involving statutes similar to Virginia's have arisen in the field of state
regulation of automobile sales franchises. The case most nearly on point with the
instant one is Willys Motors v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn.
1956), which involved a state statute allowing the cancellation of automobile franchises
only upon the showing of "just cause." The contract at issue in that case had also been
entered prior to the enactment of the statute. The court acknowledged that there had
been an impairment of the contract, but pointed out that this did not mean that the
impairment constituted a violation of the contract clause. The court stressed that the
state, in a valid exercise of its police power, could legitimately pass legislation which
would, technically speaking, impair contracts, yet not violate the contract clause of
the Constitution. The court reasoned that since protection of the economic welfare of
the state is an element of the police power, and since the statute appeared reasonably
related to such economic welfare, this was indeed a valid exercise of the state's police
power and as such could not be defeated on the grounds that it impaired existing
contracts. Accord, Khul Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420
(1955) (on rehearing).
The First Circuit has reached a contrary conclusion on an essentially similar set
of facts involving Puerto Rico's Dealer's Contract Law. However, that court, rather
than striking down the statute on impairment of contract grounds, invalidated it as
depriving wholesalers and manufacturers of property without due process of law. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to refrain from
adjudicating the case until the Puerto Rican Supreme Court had an opportunity to
place its own construction on the statute. However, in its per curiam opinion, the Court
placed great stress on the Spanish tradition of Puerto Rico and indicated that federal
courts should take special care when construing Puerto Rican laws in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 400
U.S. 41 (1970).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Section Two of this amendment provides, in relevant
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states, gives state governments an even broader sweep of control in
this particular area than they possess in the areas traditionally encompassed by the police power.46
It was this extraordinary power of the states over liquor control,
as well as the general police power, that led the Nebraska District
Court to conclude in Hodges v. Fitle" that a city ordinance prohibiting nude dancing in bars was not invalid on the grounds that it
impaired the performers' contracts. The plaintiffs in that case were
exotic dancers whose contracts called for nude performing. Their
grounds for attacking the ordinance included the argument that the
ordinance, by banning nude dancing, unconstitutionally impaired
their previously executed contractual agreements to perform. The
court sustained the ordinance on the theory that the power of the
state to regulate liquor distribution and related activities was sufficient to uphold the law, despite impairment4 8or even partial destruction of the dancers' contractual obligations.
In light of these authorities, a serious question arises as to the
soundness of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Pearl Brewing that
part: "[tihe transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." The Supreme Court has ruled that the power
granted the states by the twenty-first amendment permits not only complete prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation or possession of intoxicants, but also the
power to allow any of these activities only under definitely prescribed conditions, since
the greater power includes the lesser. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939).
See also State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, rehearing
denied, 299 U.S. 623 (1936).
"California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 948
(1973). In this case, regulations issued by the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control prohibiting explicit sexual live entertainment and films in bars were
challenged on first and fourteenth amendment grounds. Yet in the face of this challenge, the Court upheld the regulations as a valid exercise of state control over liquor
and its incidents, even though such regulations in a different context would transgress
the Court's own statements on freedom of expression:
We do not disagree with the District Court's determination that
these regulations on their face would proscribe some forms of visual
presentation that would not be found obscene under Roth and subsequent decisions of this Court. . . . But we do not believe that the
State regulatory authority in this case was limited to. . . dealing with
the problem it confronted within the limits of our [prior] decisions
409 U.S. at 116.
0332 F. Supp. 504 (D. Neb. 1971).
"'The ordinance was also challenged on the grounds that it violated first and
fourteenth amendment rights and was vague and overextensive, in addition to the
argument that it violated the contract clause of the Constitution. The court sustained
the ordinance against these other arguments. Id.

196

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

the case presented a potential conflict with the contract clause of the
Constitution. Undoubtedly the possibility of a constitutional question existed, but many cases arguably present constitutional issues
which are of little significance to the final resolution of the case.
Indeed, it has been pointed out that most cases could be said to
ultimately involve some constitutional questions. 9 However, the
clear trend of the law points to the conclusion that while "the constitutionality of the [Virginia] statute under the Contract Clause...
might be brought into question,"" the likelihood that a persuasive
argument could be made is, in fact, minimal. Thus, it would appear
that the "inchoate constitutional question"5 1 which concerned the
Fourth Circuit did not deserve the weight the court ascribed to it.2
"In Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936), Mr. Justice Cardozo alluded
to the possibility of a constitutional question arising in virtually every case and the
corresponding need to set reasonable bounds:
If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be
discovered to have their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself . . . . To set
bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction
between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral,
between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely
possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.
Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
wAFA Distrib. Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210, 1212 (4th Cir. 1973)
(emphasis added).
5
ld.
52
The Supreme Court has characterized the determination by a federal court as
to whether to abstain as a "threshold inquiry." Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951). The Court has also indicated that in making
such a threshold determination in cases raising the possibility of a federal constitutional question, the court must determine if the question is of sufficient substance to
warrant abstention: "[wihere the disposition of a doubtful question of local law might
terminate the entire controversy and thus make it unnecessary to decide a substantial
constitutional question, considerations of equity justify a rule of abstention." Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 379 n.15, quoting, Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 317 U.S. 456, 463 (1943) (emphasis added). However, the abstention cases do not
clearly indicate what test a court is to apply in determining whether the constitutional
question is "substantial" enough to justify declining jurisdiction.
Some light is shed by the Supreme Court's treatment of the somewhat analogous
problem of what a substantial federal question is for the purposes of federal court
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). The Court has indicated that where the
reliance on federal law is obviously without merit, foreclosed by prior authoritative
decisions, or frivolous, then the claim of federal jurisdiction is not substantial and must
be denied. Levering and Garrigues Co. v. Morin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933). The American
Law Institute, in the Commentary on its recent proposals for revising the scope of
federal jurisdiction, reviewed the cases and concluded: "this requirement of sustantiality of the federal claim . . . indicates only that the federal claim must be one fairly

arguable on the merits."

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIC-
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Viewing Pearl Brewing in this light, it is reasonable to conclude
that it did not present a constitutional question sufficiently substantial to serve as a basis for abstention. 3 Rather, the abstention issue
becomes simply a matter of the propriety of a federal court construing
TION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 176-77 (1969) (Official Draft). If "fairly

arguable on the merits" is accepted as a reasonable formulation of the test of substantiality for federal jurisdictional purposes, can it also be said to be the proper test of a
constitutional question for abstention purposes? It would seem to be an inappropriate
test because the decision as to jurisdiction occurs prior to the decision on abstention.
This point is perhaps best illustrated by an example.
Assume that a case is brought before a federal district court with federal jurisdiction predicated on the existence of a constitutional question. The court must, at the
very outset, make a jurisdictional determination as to the sufficiency of the alleged
constitutional issue. If the court concludes that the constitutional claim is "fairly
arguable on the merits," then it should accept jurisdiction as properly invoked. Only
after this threshold jurisdictional decision is made may the court consider the issue of
abstention. And, if in so doing, the court looks to the substantiality of the constitutional question as a factor in its consideration of the abstention issue, it must necessarily apply a stricter test of that substantiality than it did when passing on the jurisdictional question. This conclusion clearly follows from a consideration of the location of
the jurisdictional and abstention "thresholds" in the decisional process. If the jurisdictional test represents the bare minimum of substantiality that a constitutional question must possess in order to even bring the case within the purview of the federal
court, then a fortiori the test for determining whether, as a matter of discretion, to
exercise that jurisdiction must apply a "higher" standard of substantiality.
The issue therefore reduces itself to whether the constitutional question in Pearl
Brewing was sufficiently "substantial" in the sense of constituting a basis for abstention. While it seems at least arguable that the contract clause issue might suffice for
jurisdictional purposes in other circumstances, it is by no means clear that it was
substantial enough to meet the more stringent requirements of the abstention test. And
although jurisdiction in Pearl Brewing was predicated upon diversity of citizenship,
thus obviating the need to make the initial jurisdictional determination, the Fourth
Circuit arguably would have been better advised to apply the stricter abstention test
to the substantiality of the contract clause question, rather than concluding that the
mere possibility of such a question arising was sufficient to serve as its primary ground
for ordering abstention.
The American Law Institute apparently felt so strongly that a constitutional
question must be "substantial" in order to warrant abstention that the term was used
in its recently proposed codification of the abstention doctrine:
(c) A district court may stay an action, otherwise properly commenced. . . .on the ground that the action presents issues of State law
that ought to be determined in a State proceeding, if the court finds:
(2)

that abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdic-

tion is warranted

. . .

by the likelihood that the necessity

for deciding a substantial question of federal constitutional
law may thereby be avoided ....
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS

§ 1371(c)(2) (1969) (Official Draft) (emphasis added).
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a state statute involving liquor regulation in a diversity case, without
benefit of a prior state court pronouncement on the subject. Acknowledging that abstention is inappropriate merely to avoid the decision
of "difficult" questions of state law,54 the Fourth Circuit nevertheless
found that the state law was so unsettled that its decision would
amount to little more than an educated guess as to the construction
which a state court would apply. 55 Hence, the court in PearlBrewing
concluded that abstention was appropriate to avoid a tentative federal decision which might be emasculated by a later state court determination.-6
Since the Virginia statute involved in the case will admit of only
two possible interpretations, 5 the question, therefore, is whether,
despite the unsettled nature of the state law regarding its proper
construction, the circumstances presented in Pearl Brewing were
such as to preclude a sound construction of the statute by a federal
court. The Fourth Circuit found sufficient authority in the rules of
statutory construction as announced by the Virginia courts to support
either statutory interpretation, and hence concluded that this lack of
guidance called for an exercise of its power of abstention. This absence of guidance in state law for the resolution of a state question
should not, however, be dispositive of the question of the applicability of this type of abstention. The Supreme Court has stressed that
abstention is improper solely to avoid the decision of "difficult" questions of state law,59 especially in cases like Pearl Brewing in which
federal jursdiction is based on diversity of citizenship." Also, the
11470 F.2d at 1212-13. See text at notes 17-20 supra.
Because federal jurisdiction in Pearl Brewing was predicated upon diversity of
citizenship, the court was obliged by the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), to interpret the state statute in the same manner a state court would
interepret it.
11470 F.2d at 1212.
7
See notes 32-33 supra.
11470 F.2d at 1212.
5'Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,
234 (1943).
'10 he necessity for retaining jurisdiction in diversity cases presenting merely "difficult" questions of state law was explained in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 236 (1943):
Congress having adopted the policy of opening the federal courts to
suitors in all diversity cases involving the jurisdictional amount, we
can discern in its action no recognition of a policy which would exclude
cases from the jurisdiction merely because they involve state law or
because the law is uncertain or difficult to determine.
See also Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967); Pierce
v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951); Gowen and Izlar, Federal Court
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Court has ruled that the federal courts should, as a matter of fairness,
as well as in deference to the statutory grant of jurisdiction, "give due
respect to the suitor's choice of a federal forum." 6' On the other hand,
the Court has recognized that in some situations, the federal court's
construction cannot help but be merely a forecast of an authoritative
state court ruling on the matter and may subsequently be rendered
unnecessary or even overturned by a state court's later controlling
decision." Because of these conflicting considerations, questions of
the soundness of the Fourth Circuit's ultimate decision to abstain
cannot be satisfactorily resolved solely by reference to the "unsettled
issue of state law" theory of abstention invoked by the court. Consequently, the third branch of the absention doctrine relied upon in
Pearl Brewing must be examined.
Assuming, as has been suggested, that the issues in PearlBrewing
presented little or no likelihood of a substantial constitutional conflict, 3 the Fourth Circuit's Burford-type justification for abstention 4
on the grounds of avoiding federal interference with a state regulatory
scheme takes on greater significance. Indeed, Burford-type abstention is particularly applicable where, as in Pearl Brewing, the area
of state regulation involved is the distribution and sale of alcoholic
beverages. As the Fourth Circuit noted, control of liquor is within
"the peculiarly exclusive dominion of the states."65 Thus, the notions
of comity which prompted the Supreme Court in Burford66 to order
abstention appear similarly applicable to the situation presented by
PearlBrewing.b
Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEx. L. REv. 194, 201 & n.42
(1964).
"Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1968).
"Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). However, this point
was made in the context of a case raising a substantial constitutional question and
hence its thrust was to provide additional support for abstaining to avoid a perhaps
unnecessary constitutional adjudication. The instant discussion, on the other hand, is
predicated upon the absence of a constitutional question substantial enough to warrant
abstention of its own weight.
aSee text accompanying notes 37-53 supra, suggesting that the contract clause
issue perceived by the Fourth Circuit is, in light of the authorities, of questionable
merit.
O"See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
11470 F.2d at 1214.
"Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See notes 24-25 supra.
6'rhe considerations which led the Burford court to order abstention included the
complexity of the state law question, the existence of a state-defined procedure for
resolving the case and the damage to state policy caused by prior federal court pronouncements. On the other hand, under this analysis the sole justification for invoking
this type of abstention in PearlBrewing was the exclusive nature of state regulation
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Considerations of comity also served as the primary rationale for
abstention in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co.,68 a case involving a situation similar to that in Burford," in
which the Supreme Court stressed the importance of public policy
considerations in the discretionary exercise of a federal court's power
to abstain. In ordering the lower courts to abstain, the Court concluded:
Considering that "[flew public interests have a higher claim
upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance
of needless friction with state policies," the usual rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the
District Court in this case.70
And though the fact that jurisdiction in PearlBrewing was predicated
upon diversity of citizenship tends, because of the Congressional policy inherent in the grant of diversity jurisdiction, to militate against
abstention,7 it would nevertheless seem that the exclusiveness of the
states' power to regulate liquor so involves matters of state policy as
to serve as ample justification for a Burford-type abstention.
Thus, if Pearl Brewing may be seen as presenting no more than
an unsettled question of state statutory construction, and not the
"inchoate constitutional question 7 2 that the Fourth Circuit found
persuasive in ordering abstention, it would then appear that the
court's decision to abstain in order to avoid interfering with Virginia's
statutory scheme of liquor regulation was a sound one and was based
upon ample authority. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded the
case presented the possibility of a constitutional question sufficiently
substantial to serve as its primary rationale for abstention. It is thereof alocholic beverages. However, because such exclusive control is constitutionally
mandated and because of the Supreme Court's clear policy of avoiding federal encroachments on this control, it would appear that the construction of the statute in
PearlBrewing was a matter sufficiently bound up with the state's interest and policies
to warrant a Burford-type abstention.
68341 U.S. 341 (1951).
"Like Burford, Southern Railway also involved an action to enjoin enforcement
of an order issued by a state regulatory agency. And as in Burford, jurisdiction in
Southern Railway was based on diversity of citizenship and the existence of a federal
question. The Southern Railway court invoked Burford-type abstention, concluding
that the issues of state law were more properly left to the state courts. Id.
7
"Id. at 349 (footnotes omitted).
7
The Supreme Court has stressed that the Congressional policy underlying the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), argues strongly for retention of jurisdiction
by a federal court in cases brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). See note 60 supra.
72470 F.2d at 1212.
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fore necessary to examine the court's reasoning in light of this basic
premise in order to determine the soundness of its decision within the
context of the court's conceiption of the case.
Beginning with this premise-that a retrospective application of
the Virginia statute would raise a substantial contract clause question-the Fourth Circuit reasoned that since the state courts had not
spoken authoritatively as to the proper interpretation of the statute
and the Virginia rules of construction did not provide sufficient guidance, abstention was proper in order to give the state courts an opportunity to rule on the matter. In so concluding, the Fourth Circuit felt
that it was avoiding a possibly unnecessary decision on the constitutionality of the statute because a state court ruling, limiting it to
prospective application, would obviate the need to reach the constitutional question. However, in light of the crucial fact that the statute
was open to only two possible constructions regarding its application,
serious questions arise as to the soundness of this reasoning.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a federal court, when faced
with a previously unconstrued state statute, must presume that the
state courts will interpret the statute so as to avoid constitutional
conflicts.73 Notably, the Fourth Circuit recently applied this rule in
Blasecki v. City of Durham,74 a case involving a constitutional challenge to a local criminal ordinance. In that case the court upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance, despite the absence of a state court
ruling on its construction. The court characterized as "elementary"
the proposition that if more than one construction of a statute is
possible, the one which will permit the upholding of the constitutionality of the statute should be applied. 75 In Blasecki, the ordinance was
susceptible to several constructions, while in PearlBrewing the statute was open to only two.7 6 The district court in PearlBrewing construed the statute in the manner which effectively avoided the contract clause question.7 7 Hence, had the Fourth Circuit applied the
Blasecki rule of presumption here, it might well have concluded that
the district court's interpretation was a valid one even without a
controlling state court ruling. This conclusion would have been dispositive of the case. For, by accepting the presumption that state courts
"Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273,
277 (1915). Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954); Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
71456 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972).
7
11d. at 93.
"See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
"7 The district court limited the statute to prospective application only. 470 F.2d
at 1212. See note 33 supra.
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will rule so as to avoid constitutional conflicts, and by viewing the
district court's construction as the only one possible under the circumstances which prevents such a constitutional problem, it becomes evident that the district court's interpretation could have been
sustained and its dismissal on the merits affirmed on the basis of that
interpretation."' Another result of this analysis is to reduce substantially the persuasiveness of the court's Burford-type reasoning that
abstention was proper so as to avoid interference with state affairs.
For if it is presumed that the district court interpreted the statute in
the same manner that a Virginia court would have construed it had
it been afforded the opportunity, it could hardly then be argued that
the federal court's construction interferes with the state's statutory
scheme of liquor regulation. The district court would merely be
applying the law of the state as would one of the state's own courts."
And in a diversity case, this is precisely the responsibility that the
Erie doctrine places on the federal courts.
It is difficult, therefore, to understand the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Pearl Brewing presented the "special circumstances" 0
that warrant abstention, especially in view of the court's recognition
of the strong Congressional policy underlying the grant of diversity
jurisdiction as militating against abstention."
In addition to acknowledging that the legislative policy inherent
in diversity jurisdiction argues strongly against abstention, the
Fourth Circuit noted the great cost that abstention entails in terms
of time and money by compelling partial adjudication in several
1"This result would also be consistent with the approach advocated by the American Law Institute. This approach would prohibit abstention unless there is a "serious
danger" that the federal court's decision of state law might be at variance with the
view that the state court may ultimately take. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371(c)(2) (1969) (Official Draft). In light of the circumstances presented in Pearl Brewing, there would
seem little "serious danger" that a state court would reach a conclusion contrary to
that of the district court.
"In Hill v. James Walker Memorial Hosp., 407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969), the
Fourth Circuit was faced with a situation somewhat analogous to that presented in
Pearl Brewing. Hill was also a diversity case which raised a question of state law upon
which the state courts had never directly ruled. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to
decide the case on the merits "as the [state supreme court] would if confronted with
the issue." 407 F.2d at 1039. The Hill court was apparently of the opinion that the lack
of a state court decision precisely on point did not prevent it from reaching and
deciding the merits of the case.
0470 F.2d at 1213; cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1967); Propper v.
Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
"See notes 60 and 71 supra.
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courts.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the consequences
of a federal court's exercise of its power to abstain: "[a]bstention
operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts . . .
thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time . . . . "8 However, despite these considerations, the
court in Pearl Brewing concluded that the case presented one of "the
relatively rare instances" in which the value of84 abstention within the
framework of federalism outweights its costs.
It is undoubtedly true that under certain circumstances the value
of abstention outweighs the cost it entails. However, it is not altogether certain that this was the situation in PearlBrewing. This point
becomes especially clear in light of the court's ultimate disposition
of the case. In addition to vacating the district court's construction
of the statute, the Fourth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint, though not on the merits. In Doud v. Hodge 5 the Supreme
Court specifically held that dismissal is improper in cases involving
constitutional issues along with the state law questions. However,
several years later the Court retreated from this strict approach
and described retention of jurisdiction pending the outcome of a
state court adjudication of the state questions as merely the "better
practice."86
Whether summary dismissal was the "better practice" in Pearl
Brewing is open to question.87 The result of disposing of a case without a decision on the merits and without ordering retention of jurisdiction by the lower federal court was the subject of analysis in
England v. LouisianaState Board of Medical Examiners.8 The Court
"470 F.2d at 1213. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (six year delay of decision on the merits because abstention
was ordered); United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965) (dismissed
as moot eight years after abstention was ordered); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (seven year delay).
aBaggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964) (citations omitted).
"1470 F.2d at 1213. However, it has also been said that the cost of abstention is
"an unnecessary price to pay for our federalism." England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute;PartII, 36 U. CHI. L. Rav. 268,
317 (1969).
'z350 U.S. 485 (1956).
"Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967).
"Indeed, the Fourth Circuit confessed to difficulty in deciding whether, on remand, the district court should retain jurisdiction. It concluded: "[w]e think it the
'better practice' on the facts of this case to require the parties to submit all questions
to the state court." 470 F.2d 1210, 1214 (4th Cir. 1973).
"375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
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there pointed out that dismissal of a case on the basis of the "judgefashioned vehicle""9 of abstention where the federal court's jurisdiction is properly invoked not only deprives the litigants of their statutory right to a federal forum, but also compels them to expend additional time and monies in protracted litigation. And while the Court
acknowledged that an appeal from the highest state court to the
Supreme Court may be available to the litigants, nevertheless they
have, by virtue of the principles of res judicata, lost the advantages
of federal fact-finding when forced to go to trial in a state court."
Thus, in dealing with the issue of abstention a federal court must
balance the policies favoring declining jurisdiction against the costs
that abstention entails, such as prolonged and piecemeal litigation,
increased expenditures of time and money, and the potential denial
of the litigants' statutory rights. As a part of this balancing process,
the federal court has a duty to scrutinize closely those factors which,
in the court's view, call for abstention in order to determine if they
are sufficient to warrant its exercise. In concluding that abstention
was appropriate and thus affirming the order of dismissal, the Fourth
Circuit relied heavily upon the possibility of a constitutional issue
which would appear to be of questionable substance.9 It is therefore
doubtful whether, on balance, the possibility of such a constitutional
question being raised warranted a summary dismissal of the action,
thereby compelling the litigants to begin again in the state courts.
The words of Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in the
England case seem particularly relevant here:
Whether or not we agree . . . that the present case involves no
substantial federal question, it certainly borders on the insubstantial; and a District Court, if it has that view of the case,
should be allowed in its discretion to decide the whole case at
"'Id. at 415.
"Recognizing the basic unfairness in such a result, the Court in England fashioned
a procedure which insures that the litigants may have a federal forum for at least their
federal issues. This procedure provides that a federal court which chooses to abstain,
rather than dismissing the case outright, should suspend the proceedings, retaining
jurisdiction, and remit the parties to the state courts. The litigants may then present
just the state issues to the state court while reserving the right to return to the federal
court to try any of the federal issues remaining after the state court's determination.
Id. at 419-22.
This procedure has been criticized on two grounds. First, the state court may feel
that it is unable to decide the state issues since its decision would be no more than an
advisory opinion. And second, even if the state court agrees to decide the state issues
subject to the reservation, this procedure still entails delay and piecemeal adjudication. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 198-99 (2d ed. 1970).
"See text accompanying notes 39-53 supra.
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of interferonce, avoiding the state litigation completely-free
92
ence here or in the Court of Appeals.
These sentiments would appear equally applicable to PearlBrewing,
in view of the insubstantial nature of the constitutional question.
In addition to the questions which have been raised regarding the
Pearl Brewing court's decision to abstain as a means of avoiding a
constitutional adjudication, the rendering of an unguided decision on
an unsettled aspect of state law, and federal intervention in state
policies,93 another, more mechanical aspect of the case is worthy of
note. The Fourth Circuit relied largely on the theory that where a case
involves the interpretation of a state statute fairly open to interpretation, and a state court ruling may obviate the need to adjudicate the
constitutionality of the statute, the federal courts should refrain from
passing on the constitutionality of the statute until the state court
has had a reasonable opportunity to construe it." However, on the
facts of Pearl Brewing as they appear in the court's opinion, this
reasoning is arguably inapposite. The statute was open to two possible constructions, one of which would raise potential contract clause
questions while the other would avoid constitutional conflict completely. The district court applied the latter interpretation and dismissed the case.9" By so ruling, the district court rejected the construction leading to a possible constitutional challenge and hence
avoided the need to pass on the validity of the statute under the
contract clause. With this procedural background, it is difficult to
understand the Fourth Circuit's justification of abstention on the
11375 U.S. at 430 (Douglas, J., concurring).
O3In addition to these three primary grounds for abstention, the Fourth Circuit also
discussed a fourth rationale for its decision; the plaintiff-appellant was a corporate
citizen of Virginia and hence had "no reason to fear a provincial locally oriented court."
470 F.2d at 1213-14. Though this fear of local prejudice may, in extreme cases, be a
persuasive reason for refusing to abstain, it can hardly be said that the absence of local
prejudice constitutes an affirmative justification for abstention. To treat it otherwise
would be to ignore the Congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970), and the policy underlying that grant as enunciated by the Supreme Court.
Bank of the United States v. Beveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). The Fourth
Circuit admittedly did not rely heavily upon the absence of local prejudice as a basis
for abstention. However, since the court treated it as "[a]n additional justifying
factor," 470 F.2d at 1213, it is important to point out that the lack of local prejudice
does not affirmatively "justify" abstention. Rather, it serves as an important requirement which must be met before abstention can be invoked, but which cannot, of its
own force, provide a positive ground for abstention. It would therefore seem that the
Fourth Circuit's reliance upon this factor as one of its four substantive bases for
abstention is arguably misplaced.
"1470 F.2d at 1211-12.
"Id. at 1211.
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grounds of avoiding an unnecessary constitutional adjudication, for
this is precisely the effect of the district court's decision. Of course,
had it accepted the alternative construction, the district court would
then have possibly been faced with a need to reach the issue of the
constitutionality of the statute. Hence, by disposing of the case on the
non-constitutional issue, the district court acted completely in accord
with the announced policy of the Supreme Court that federal courts
should, where reasonably possible, avoid the necessity of a constitutional adjudication by deciding a case on grounds that eliminate the
need for such a decision." It therefore appears that the Fourth Circuit, in justifying abstention on the basis of avoiding the decision of
a constitutional question, relied upon an argument which is singularly unpersuasive in light of the district court's treatment of the
case.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in PearlBrewing is therefore subject
to serious question in terms of both the substantive grounds advanced
in support of abstention and the internal logic of the decision itself.
An analysis of the issues raised by the case and the court's attempt
to resolve them points to at least two conclusions. First, and most
importantly, is that the court invoked the discretionary doctrine of
abstention in a case which, as a threshold matter, arguably did not
call for such treatment. Particularly, the court's perception of a constitutional issue and its conclusion that the issue was sufficiently
substantial to serve as a primary rationale for abstention are open to
criticism. Second, at least some of the substantive grounds the court
relied upon were perhaps inapposite and unpersuasive within the
context of the case. Admittedly, the exercise of the power of abstention is subject to the discretion of the court and requires the weighing
of a variety of factors." Even allowing for the elasticity that such a
formulation permits, it is nevertheless suggested that the grounds
advanced by the Fourth Circuit to justify its decision in Pearl
Brewing do not, even when taken together, sufficiently counterbalance those factors militating against such a decision so as to warrant
the court's summary invocation of its abstention power.
However, such confusion is, unfortunately, more the rule than the
exception as federal courts struggle to balance the policies inherent
in the concept of federalism against the exigencies of federal court
"Mr. Justice Brandeis emphatically made this point in his well-known concurring
opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (see
cases cited therein). For recent affirmations of this principle, see, e.g., Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); United States
v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
"Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).

